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Public procurement is officially regarded as an effective means to secure environmental 
improvement. Estimates by the European Commission indicate that public authorities within 
the European Union typically purchase goods and services corresponding to approximately 16 
percent of GNP per annum. Hence, it is believed, private firms can be stimulated to invest in 
sustainable production technologies if the market power of public bodies is exerted through 
Green Public Procurement (GPP) policies. In this paper we assess whether GPP is a cost-
efficient policy tool, and if so whether its implementation can, from a welfare perspective, 
deter or stimulate entry to procurement markets.  
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For many countries globally, public procurement represents a significant proportion of the 
economy. Notably, estimates indicate that public authorities in the European Union (EU) 
purchase goods and services corresponding to approximately 16 percent of the EU’s annual 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (COM, 2008).
1
However, the credit given ex ante to GPP as a viable environmental policy tool has not been 
thoroughly  academically  validated.  GPP and its impact in terms of both environmental 
effectiveness and cost-efficiency need to be further analyzed (Lundberg et al., 2008). This 
need is increased by the fact that the expectations of GPP are  typical very high. Many 
governments and authorities rely heavily upon GPP as an accepted environmental policy 
instrument (as illustrated by the Swedish Government Bill 2008/09:162). Cost-efficiency and 
market competition are important aspects to consider when striving to achieve a sustainable 
soc iety. Consequently, the potential of GPP to contribute to the attainment of sustainable 
development should also be evaluated. The international literature in this field is limited, 
 For a national example, in 2006 the Swedish 
authorities purchased goods and services totaling between 450 and 535 billion SEK, which 
corresponds to 15-18 percent of annual GDP (Bergman, 2008). Because of their considerable 
purchasing power, public authorities are often regarded as having the power to promote 
sustainable development by stimulating (or demanding) the use of more energy efficient, less 
polluting production techniques and renewable resources. This paper assesses public 
procurement standards as a policy tool to encourage sustainable development. 
  
Public procurement, or in the context of sustainability, Green Public Procurement (GPP), is 
officially regarded as an internationally important, flexible and powerful policy instrument. 
The European Commission (EC) has emphasized the importance of cost-efficient GPP (COM, 
2008) and, in compliance with the EU’s Integrated Product Policy (IPC), Member States have 
been encouraged to devise national action plans. Accordingly, the role that environmental 
criteria play in procurement has grown in importance, at both national and EU levels. In 2004 
the EC published a handbook with the clear aim to help public authorities to implement GPP 
(European Commission, 2004). The EC appears to be very clear in its ambition of how GPP 
can contribute to sustainability.  
 
                                                                 
1 The corresponding figure is 9 percent for the OECD countries during 1990-1997 (average total expenditure 
minus employee compensation as a percentage of GDP; Marron, 2003). 3 
 
particularly with respect to GPP in the context of welfare economics. Therefore, the major 
objectives of this paper are to identify and discuss general issues that need to be addressed 
when considering environmental criteria in public procurement, and the pros and cons of GPP 
within a framework of welfare economics.  Questions considered being  of particular 
importance for this research paper include whether GPP is a cost-efficient policy instrument 
and whether it affects competition in terms of the number of tenders made.  
 
When considering GPP as an environmental policy tool it is important to remember the 
fundamental reasons for engaging in public procurement, since public authorities could 
simply provide all their services in-house, rather than through e xternal suppliers. However, by 
allowing private firms to compete for certain public provision contracts it is maintained that 
society gains by obtaining better value for money. The basic rationale is that compe tition 
stimulates innovation and encourages specialization. It would be very expensive to finance a 
public sector that was specialized in all areas for which it provided services, and compe tition 
in itself leads to lower prices (see Bergman, Nilsson, and Pyddoke, 2005). In this paper it is 
therefore argued that when GPP is implemented its effect on competition must be considered. 
Environmental gains could be offset by losses in efficiencies due to the restriction of 
competition. The implementation of GPP is a complex task and it also needs to be carefully 
adapted to take account of existing environmental policy tools that have already been applied 
to address environmental problems. Here, GPP is approached as either a complement to, or a 
substitute for, other types of environmental policy instruments. In this context it is important 
to compare different environmental policy instruments and their properties with respect to for 
example cost-efficiency. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. In the following section the available academic literature is 
discussed in more detail. In Section 3, the institutional settings required for the 
implementation of GPP are outlined, together with its potential to create incentives for private 
industry to invest in more environmentally sustainable technologies. GPP in the context of 
cost-efficiency and its relationship with other environmental policy tools are discussed in 
Section 4. The importance of competition and relevant inter-related issues are considered in 
Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper and provides a summary and analysis of the benefits 
and disadvantages of GPP.  
   4 
 
 
2. Previous studies 
 
As an environmental policy tool, GPP has been little studied, particularly in the field of 
economics. Further, authors who have considered GPP have generally treated it as an 
established policy and either analyzed its effects on specific products and firms’ costs (e.g., 
Marron, 1997; Sterner, 2002; Cerin, 2006; D’Amoto, 2006; Parikka-Alhola, 2008; Geng and 
Doberstein, 2008), or assessed case studies of the practical implementation of GPP (see 
Thomson and Jackson, 2007, for a UK example). None of the cited authors have questioned 
whether GPP is an adequate environmental policy tool or considered  how it should be 
assessed.  Certain other authors have been more prescriptive, arguing that since public 
authorities have considerable market power, they should implement GPP by making eco-
labeling mandatory when formulating environmental procurement criteria (Grolleau et al., 
2004). In addition, the wider question of how to make local government budgets greener has 
been addressed in a book edited by Clinch et al. (2002). Here, the concept of making budgets 
greener covered the role of subsidies as well as public purchasing at local government level. 
The research was generally descriptive in nature and, once again, the question of whether 
GPP should be viewed as a complement to, or a substitute for, other types of environmental 
tools was not highlighted.  
 
Furthermore, in analyzing GPP as an environmental policy tool it is informative but not 
sufficient merely to report changes in the use of environmental criteria in public procurement 
contracts (in terms of degree and frequency), which is the approach adopted by Nissinen et al. 
(2009) and Kippo-Edlund et al. (2005). Neither of those studies posed the critical questions 
regarding  the appropriateness of GPP as a welfare-enhancing policy tool, and how to 
implement it. The authors of the present paper maintain that, from the perspective of cost-
efficiency  and market competition, GPP has  not  been  well studied and this research 
contributes to the available literature in these respects.  
 
3. Implementing GPP 
 
Following EU procurement directives (Directive 2004/17/EC and Directive 2004/18/EC), the 
inclusion of environmental requirements in public procurement contracts are deemed to be 5 
 
valid as long as they do not discriminate firms from submitting a tender.
2 Briefly, the EU 
directives stipulate sealed bidding for public contracts, which can subsequently be awarded 
according to either of two principles. Contracts are awarded either to the supplier who has 
submitted the lowest price bid or to the supplier  considered to have submitted the most 
economically advantageous bid. When a procuring entity publishes a call for tender it must 
state the principle that will be applied to evaluate bids. A contract assignment that must 
conform to the principle of the most economically advantageous bid means that, in addition to 
price, weight is also given to other criteria such as environmental aspects. The environmental 
criteria and the means by which such criteria will be evaluated against quality and price must 
be specified in the call for tender.
3 By specifying environmental criteria the procuring entity is 
enforcing GPP. Irrespective of  the  assignment principle, the winning firm is paid in 
accordance with its bid. Under both principles the procedures for bid evaluation and the 
assignment of contracts are regulated by the directives. If price is the sole factor determining 
which firm is contracted, the bid is said to be “one dimensional”. If additional criteria are 
specified when the contracts  are  assigned, the bids are termed “multidimensional”. For 
simplicity, it is assumed here that the bids are two-dimensional, meaning that two criteria are 
applied; price and environmental aspects.
4
The environmental criteria may be mandatory, obliging the firm to demonstrate its ability to 
satisfy them in order to be considered as a qualified bidder. Such criteria can have varying 
degrees of  stringency. However, environmental criteria may also be recommended, rather 
than obligatory. Again, in such cases criteria can have  varying degrees of  stringe ncy. 
Furthermore,  regardless of whether they are mandatory or recommended, weights can be 
assigned to environmental criteria relative to the price of the procured goods or services. This 
 The environmental dimension can take the form of 
eco-labeling, environmental  standards, technical standards, material specifications, 
requirement  of  specific processes and  production methods, and/or  performance-based 
specifications.  The criteria may include clauses that oblige bidding  firms to change their 
production technology in order to meet the public procurement requirements. 
 
                                                                 
2 The EU directives stipulate five principles to be followed by procuring entities. These are the principles of 
mutual recognition, proportionality, transparency, equal treatment, and non-discrimination. The common 
denominator of these principles is that tenders, or their bids, should be assessed under conditions of effective 
competition. 
3 An overview and discussion of different models for evaluating bids according to price and quality criteria is 
presented by Andersson and Lunander (2004). 
4 In reality several types of criteria related to quality aspects, such as references and competence, can be listed 
and weighed against price.  6 
 
gives the procuring entity an opportunity to tailor its implementation of GPP in several ways 
and to decide the relative importance of environmental sustainability and product price. That 
is, the procuring entity can combine environmental criteria ranging from low to high 
stringe ncy, with low to  high weights attributed to specified criteria. A typical example of a 
weak criterion would be eco-labeling of some kind, which is generally fulfilled by all firms in 
a market. As indicated in Table 1, the design of a GPP contract will determine its potential to 
promote  environmental sustainability.  Application of weak environmental criteria in 
combination with the assignation of low weights to these factors will create little or no need 
for firms to invest in more environmentally friendly technologies in order to fulfill the criteria, 
and as such will have little or no effect on sustainability. 
 
When the environmental criteria are weighted against price, contracts are assigned according 
to the most economically advantageous bid. However, using the principle of lowest price does 
not rule out the option to implement GPP. Procuring entities can specify environmental 
criteria that are mandatory and award the contract to the lowest bidding firm that can fulfill 
the criteria. Again the criteria can range from low to high levels of significance.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
When environmental  criteria are selected and formulated by the procuring entity, several 
factors must be considered to ensure the functioning of GPP. Primarily, the criteria should be 
adapted to the environmental problems associated with the purchases made to fulfill the GPP 
contract. In addition, if other environmental policy tools are already in force, such as a tax or 
fee, then the GPP must complement them. Furthermore, cost efficiency must be considered 
when evaluating GPP. Finally, its effect on market competition must also be carefully 
evaluated. These considerations are discussed in the following sections, starting with cost-
efficiency and followed  by market-oriented  aspects, such as  the  impact  of GPP on 
competition and the relative importance of the procuring entity in the market.  
 
4. GPP and cost efficiency 
 
This section compares GPP to other environmental policy measures, assesses cost-efficiency 
and evaluates whether GPP fulfils the environmental objectives. 
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4.1 GPP versus other environmental policy measures 
 
GPP should be considered as an administrative (or quantitative) environmental policy tool. 
Administrative tools can be implemented by  the  command and control  approaches  to 
environm ental management, which can include the  specification of maximum  allowed 
emissions and detail the requirements of products, production processes or technologies. All 
these measures have a common aspect in that they are  not usually cost-efficient.  More 
specifically, their implementation does not generally lead to the cost-minimized allocation of 
resources used to achieve a specified target. In the context of GPP, this could be attributed to 
the procuring entity having incomplete  information  about  all  potential suppliers, their 
products and production technologies, and also not being aware of all available production 
technologies. In  GPP, command and control style requirements for products, production 
processes, and technologies are commonplace. Requirements may cite the need, for example, 
to use a specific technology in the production of a procured product, or to use certain products 
that do not contain specified hazardous substances when supplying a procured service. 
However, a major problem in a cost-efficiency perspective of the command and control 
approach is that it contains no inherent mechanism to ensure that producers who could abate 
pollution at the lowest cost do so (Perman et al., 1996, p.223-226). This can be argued to be 
valid for GPP, as a call for tenders will specify exactly the same environmental requirements 
for all potential bidders, but of course imposes no restrictions on firms who do not bid. 
 
An alternative approach to environmental control is the use of economic tools, such as taxes, 
subsidies and tradable permits. Taxes and subsidies impact upon emission levels indirectly via 
the price mechanism. Tradable permits work in terms of regulated quantities, similar to the 
administrative policy tools described above. However, in this case a market is established in 
which permits may be traded at a certain price and a relative price is established between a 
permit and a  marginal emission reduction.  This will create essentially the same economic 
incentive to adjust environmentally as in the case of, e.g., a tax (Perman et al., 1996, p. 226-
229). As demonstrated in the following section, economic policy tools are automatically cost-
efficient, because all producers in the market will adjust their productions technology until 





4.2 Cost-efficiency – What does it mean in the context of GPP? 
 
The fundamental point of environmental policy is that it should encourage resources to be 
allocated  in  such  a manner that  welfare is maximized. Therefore, economically efficient 
environmental policy centers on the satisfaction of two conditions (see, e.g., Perman et al., 
1996, p. 220). Firstly, given perfect information concerning pollution quantities and their 
environmental impact, environmental objectives must be optimized. Formally, this entails that 
a socially optimal objective is achieved when the benefit of additional environmental control 
balances the  cost of implementing this additional control. Secondly, the environmental 
objectives must be achieved at least cost. If these two efficiency conditions are met, resources, 
including environmental resources, are allocated in a manner that maximizes welfare. 
However, it is unrealistic to assume that public bodies will have perfect  information  (as 
assumed above), and thus  it is unreasonable to assume that they can price environmental 
resources precisely. Therefore, from a social welfare perspective, it is almost impossible to 
establish optimal environmental objectives. Instead, desired  environmental objectives are 
established, and the cost-efficiency condition should be the guiding rule in achieving these 
objectives (Perman et al., 1996, p. 217).
5
                                                                 
5 Note that this means that cost-efficient environmental policy does not necessarily lead to improved overall 
social welfare. If the environmental target is set incorrectly the environmental policy measure may not contribute 
to sustainability even if it is cost-efficient. 
 
 
When evaluating GPP as an environmental policy tool it is important to consider  cost-
efficiency and what this term actually means. As a simple example, assume that an 
environmental problem originates from polluting firms  that are different in terms of 
production technologies, and that the authorities are about to  decide upon a pollution 
reductions target. Furthermore, assume that no other environmental policy tools are currently 
being applied to address this particular problem. Ideally, the authority should implement a 
policy tool that leads to the reduction of pollution in a cost-efficiently manner. However, if 
the polluters use different technologies they will also differ in the required reduction of their 
emitted pollutant loads. This means that when the environmental objective is achieved cost-
efficiently, i.e., when the marginal cost of reduction between firms is identical, they will have 





[Figure 1 about here] 
 
For simplicity, assume that there are only two firms (A and B) that use different production 
technologies, and hence differ in their pollution reduction costs, as illustrated by the different 
marginal cost curves,  B A MC MC ≠ , shown in the figur e. Note that it is the marginal cost for 
pollution abatement that is illustrated. Furthermore, assume that the government decides to 
impose a tax, t, per unit of pollution that corresponds to society’s desired pollution reduction 
target, z
S. Inherent in the tax mechanism is the impetus for both firms to reduce their pollution 
optimally in terms of cost-efficiency (i.e., at lowest cost), which means that the following 
condition will be satisfied: 
 
(1)   𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴
1 = 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵
1 = 𝑡𝑡 
 
As a consequence, firm A will reduce its level of pollution less than firm B, since 𝑧𝑧𝐴𝐴
1 < 𝑧𝑧𝐵𝐵
1. In 
the cost-efficient outcome the firms’ pollution levels will also sum to society’s desired level. 
In the general case this means that: 
 
(2)  ∑ 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1 = 𝑧𝑧𝑆𝑆    where the number of bidders is 𝑖𝑖 = 1,…,𝑛𝑛 
 
GPP can then be analyzed from the perspective of cost-efficiency. Furthermore, GPP often 
stipulates environmental criteria in terms of command and control style specifications, e.g. 
specifying the adoption of a certain technology or the use of certain materials. Hence the 
fulfillment of environmental requirements results in homogenous producers. Therefore, when 
bidding firms have adjusted their production processes to accommodate the contractual 
environmental requirements of a GPP tender, they utilize the same production technology and 
therefore emit the same levels of pollution. As illustrated below, whether or not GPP reduces 
pollution cost-efficiently will depend on whether firms are initially homogeneous in 
production technology or not.  
  
Assume that two firms (A and B) are bidding for a public contract. Initially, they are 
homogeneous in terms of their production technology so their marginal cost curves for 
pollution abatement are identical, 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴 = 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵. Assume further that the procuring entity 10 
 
applies GPP, and that the environmental criteria are set such that the socially desired level of 
pollution (𝑧𝑧𝑆𝑆 ) will be reached if all firms adjust their production processes in accordance with 
the required environmental standards. Since the environmental criteria are identical for all 
bidders, their pollution reduction will in the general case also be identical, 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 = 𝑧𝑧𝑆𝑆 𝑛𝑛 ⁄  . As 
illustrated in Figure 2, if both firms make the necessary investment to satisfy the bid’s 
requirements, cost-efficiency will be reached, 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴
1 = 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵
1,  and each firm reduces their 
pollution by 𝑧𝑧𝐴𝐴
1 = 𝑧𝑧𝐵𝐵
1. So, given initially identical production technology among bidding 
firms, GPP can be cost-efficient.  
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Next, assume instead that firms are initially heterogeneous in terms of production technology,  
and that GPP is implemented in the same manner as described above. This will mean that 
some firms may need to undertake only minor adjustments in order to satisfy the tender’s 
technological requirements while others may need to do considerably more. Therefore, their 
adjustment costs, i.e., their reduction costs, may differ substantially. In the two firm case this 
is reflected by differences in their marginal cost  of reduction  curves,  B A MC MC ≠ . As 
illustrated in Figure 3, the imposition of identical environmental criteria on all bidding firms 
will again result in equal pollution levels after they have made the necessary investments in 
order to fulfill the criteria, 𝑧𝑧𝐴𝐴
1 = 𝑧𝑧𝐵𝐵
1 . However, although a socially desirable level of pollution 




Furthermore, if at least one of the potential bidders decides not to participate in the 
procurement auction, because it  does  not expect the benefits to outweigh the costs of 
investment, then the total sum of the bidding firms’ pollution levels will not equal the socially 
desirable level of pollution. In this case, not only is the implementation of GPP cost-
inefficient, it miss-out the environmental objectives. 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
If GPP is to work cost-efficiently in practice, the procuring entities will need to be highly 
competent in specifying their environmental requirements, and highly aware of the flow and 
quality of information in society. The simple scenario outlined  above indicates that the 11 
 
procuring entity needs to know the differences between every single producer when 
formulating the call for a public tender. In theory, the public authority needs to know the cost 
of reduction function for every one of its prospective entrepreneurs. If the pollution reduction 
target is to be achieved correctly, this will involve different firms adjusting their processes 
accordingly, so that they meet the authority’s contractual specifications. Therefore, the public 
tender process will place differing demands on interested firms, depending on the extent of 
investment needed to comply with the GPP contract.  Exactly the same demand cannot be 
made for all firms in the tender contract. Of course, cost-efficiency is even more complicated 
and difficult to attain if the procurement entity has to consider the complete environmental 
life cycle (i.e., life cycle analysis) for each product it puts out to public tender, as is often the 
case in reality.  
   12 
 
 
4.3 GPP or economic instruments – Goal-fulfillment or cost-efficiency? 
 
As previously concluded, perfect information is essential for administrative environmental 
policy tools, such as GPP, to work cost-efficiently. However, the cost of obtaining perfect 
information is extremely high (infinite) and procuring entities are therefore forced to 
formulate calls for tenders based on incomplete information.
6
Incomplete information will also affect the results of using economic policy instruments, such 
as an environmental tax on industrial emissions. Since the regulating authorities do not know 
every producing firm’s cost of reduction function, it is difficult to know in advance how large 
an emission reduction a specific tax rate will lead to (Bamoul and Oates, 1988). This means 
that a cost-efficient policy tool may be associated with uncertainty, and may therefore be 
inefficient in terms of goal-fulfillment.
 Hence, GPP will never resolve 
environmental problems cost-efficiently in practice.
 Furthermore, it is important to note that 
the cost-efficiency condition should also include related costs, such as monitoring, 
administration,  and  the  resources needed to persuade producers  to  adjust their process 
technologies to accommodate the requirements of the policy instrument in question. However, 
the appropriate choice of environmental policy instrument, e.g. a tax or GPP, should not 
always be solely based on cost-efficiency. 
 
7
                                                                 
6 See Carlton and Perloff (2005). 
7 The particular uncertainty referred to does not concern tradable permits, because the number of permits that are 
distributed among polluting sources represents an environmental target measured as a quantity. However, in this 
case the uncertainty is associated with the price a permit should be set at. 
 If a tax is introduced at too low a rate, then its full 
environmental objective will not be realized. In response to such an outcome, the tax rate may 
be  increased, but the delay entailed in reaching  the appropriate level  may result in 
considerable damage to the  environment. In this regard, administrative tools,  such as 
specifying technological requirements,  can  be more efficient in terms of goal-fulfillment 
because large emission reductions can be achieved relatively quickly (Perman, 1996, p. 226). 
This approach is especially valid if ‘green’ technologies are already available on the market 
but not yet commonly adopted, and this could be one argument in favor of GPP. Furthermore, 
there is  the possibility  of  combining  administrative and economic  environmental policy 
instruments, e.g. environmental taxes and GPP. The selection of a suitable policy instrument, 
when dealing with uncertainty is not a trivial issue because the preferred choice will depend 
on the specific environmental problem and its mitigation costs. As first shown by Weitzman 13 
 
(1974), a useful “rule of thumb” may be that an administrative approach is the best choice if 
the margina l damage of, for example, emissions rises  sharply relative to the marginal 
abatement cost, whereas a pr ice too l (e.g. a tax) may be preferable if the marginal abatement 
costs rise sharply relative to the marginal damage. Finally, another plausible reason for the tax 
rate being  set  too low compared to the environmental ambitions may be the political 
difficulties associated with burden of taxation. In this situation, it may be politically easier to 
manage environmental objectives by adopting  joint, complementary  taxation and GPP 
policies.  
 
A further debate regarding administrative versus economic environmental policy instruments 
concerns dynamic efficiency (Perman et al., 1996, p. 223-226). When private industry adjusts 
to  economic  policy  tools,  for example environmental taxes, it  may  encourage continued 
innovative behavior which affects  both  products and processes.  In essence, economic 
instruments may impose stronger incentives for firms to adopt new cost-reducing technologies 
than more administrative forms of regulation. A simple reason for this is that a tax (or 
purchase of permits) not only imposes a pollution abatement cost, but also continues as a tax 
cost for the emissions which are still released to the environment (see, for instance, Milliman 
and Prince, 1989, Jung, 1996, and Porter and van der Linde, 1995). A hypothesis is therefore 
proposed that  these tools may be considered as continually stimulating  technological 
development and productivity and hence moderating the initial cost increase. Porter and van 
der Linde (1995) extended this observation by claiming that environmental policy, when 
designed properly,
8
Whether GPP should be implemented, and to what extent, is continge nt on the environmental 
problem(s) that the policy is intended to address. This decision depends in part on the degree 
to which the environmental externality associated with the public purchase is internalized (i.e. 
brought into economic decision-making) by other policy tools. The relationship between GPP 
and other environmental policy tools is summarized in Table 2, in three scenarios. (1) If the 
 improves dyn amic efficiency to such an extent that it more than offsets 
the initial cost imposed, and in fact improves competitiveness in the long term. This latter 
hypothesis, known as the ‘Porter hypothesis’ is, however, difficult to confirm and has been 
completely rejected by empirical studies (Brännlund and Lundgren, 2009). 
 
                                                                 
8 According to Porter and van der Linde (1995), environmental regulations should include pollution taxes, 
deposit-refund schemes, and tradable permits. 
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environmental externality  caused by the production or consumption of the goods being 
purchased is not internalized, GPP could have a role to play. If all other environmental policy 
options have been considered and GPP is the best choice it should be implemented. However, 
it is then  important  to adapt GPP to ensure that it addresses the relevant  environmental 
objectives. This entails carefully selecting the appropriate environmental criteria, and  any 
weights attached to these specifications, to reflect both the externality caused by the purchase 
and the desired environmental objectives set by the government. (2) If the externality is partly 
internalized, GPP coul d play a role that complements the policy tools already in force. Again, 
GPP must be evaluated relative to other alternative environmental policy tools and optimized 
to  match  the required environmental  objectives. (3) Finally, if the externality is fully 
internalized, GPP would do more harm than good from a welfare perspective and should not 
be  implemented. Given the assumption that bids are either two  dimensional or one 
dimensional, a consequence of the third outcome  would be that contracts should only be 
awarded according  to  price. That is, bids   should be  one dimensional,  meaning that  no 
environmental criteria should be specified in the call for tender.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
5. GPP and competition effects 
 
In the auction literature (e.g. Vickrey, 1961; Laffont, 1997) it is well established that bids 
decrease with increasing numbers of bidders. For simplicity, one can assume a situation in 
which bids are one dimensional and the contract is awarded according to the lowest price. In 
such cases, the public procurement process takes the form of a first-price sealed bid auction in 


























   




                                                                 
9  At equilibrium, each bidder assumes, correctly, that competitors act in accordance with the bidding rules 
described by the first-price, sealed bid auction. As a consequence, expression (3) is valid for all bidders. See 
McAfee and McMillan (1987). 15 
 
Here, 𝗽𝗽𝑖𝑖(𝑐𝑐) is the bid placed by bidder i, which is a function of the actual cos t for completing 
the contract, c,
10 and the second term is the mark up, which is monotonically decreasing in n, 
the number of bidders.
11
Based on the assumptions made above, type B firms will typically submit  lower bids  than 
type A firms, and if GPP is not in practice (bids are one dimensional) they will have a higher 
 Differentiation of expression (3) with respect to n will prove that the 
more bidders there are, the clos er the bid will be to the cost, and the less profit the winning 
bidder will make. Empirical evidence of this competition effect on bid level is found, for 
example, in  Gupta (2002) and Lundberg (2005). Even if bidders are assumed to be 
heterogeneous in cost, due to for example difference in production technology,  bids are 
decreasing in  n. From a welfare perspective, the  de gree of compe tition is central to a 
maximizing outcome being reached. The more bidders there are for a tender, the closer the 
procurement auction will come to realizing the optimal welfare point for society.  
 
In order to evaluate the total impact of implementing GPP on social welfare, its effect on 
market competition must be considered. The enforcement of GPP can be seen to impose an 
entry restriction upon potential entrepreneurs, thereby limiting competition. If firms  are 
homogeneous in terms of production technology this will result in the procuring entity paying 
higher prices. In reality, however, production technology is rarely homogeneous among firms. 
If production technology is assumed to be heterogeneous instead, the effect on the degree of 
competition will  vary.  Specifying environmental criteria in public tender contracts  coul d 
actually restrict entry of  some firms but attract others to the  procurement auction. For 
simplicity,  it is assumed that there are  two  types of firms and that investment in 
environmentally friendly technology results in increases  in both costs and bid prices, see 
expression (3): 
 
Type A: Firms that have invested in environmentally friendly technology. The investment is 
driven by factors other than GPP being in force. 
 
Type B: Firms that have not invested in environmentally friendly technology. 
 
                                                                 
10 Theoretically, the cost, c, can be thought of as being drawn from a probability distribution with a cumulative 
distribution function F(c),  and different assumptions can be made about whether each firm’s costs are 
independent, common, or linked to the costs of its competitors. 
11 The theoretical principles of the first-price sealed bid auction can, for example, be found in Milgrom (1989, 
2004), Klemperer (1999, 2004), Krishna (2002), and Menezes and Monteiro (2005). 16 
 
probability of winning the contract. Being aware of this situation, type  A firms will not 
participate in the auction. On the other hand, if the procuring entity practices GPP and bids 
are of a two dimensional nature, type A firms will enter the auction since they know their 
investments will be valued and therefore have a higher probability of winning. Type B firms 
face the following decision: to stay out of the procurement auction or make the investment 
required to meet the environmental criteria. The outcome of that decision will be determined 
by the expected pay-off from making the investment. If the potential benefits of investment 
outweigh the costs then type B firms will submit a bid, otherwise they will not. This leads us 
to three possible scenarios regarding the implementation of  GPP and the  degree of 
competition:  
 
1.  Positive effect:  The number of Type A firms that enter the  procurement auction 
exceeds the number of Type B firms that exit the market. 
 
2.  Negative effect:  The number of Type B firms that exit the  procurement auction 
exceeds the number of Type A firms that enter it. 
 
3.  No effect: The positive and negative effects cancel each other out. 
 
Note that the effect on the degree of competition is separate from the effect of price. As a 
consequence of the assumptions made above (i.e., that meeting the environmental criteria will 
demand investment whi ch affects costs), in expression (3) the outcome could be that bid 
prices are higher although more bids may be placed. The ultimate scenario that is observed in 
reality is entirely market-specific and o f an empirical nature. 
 
Overall, the implementation and effectiveness of GPP is revealed as being a complex task 
associated with important considerations ranging from cost-efficiency  and the degree of 
market competition to price  formation.  The following section  draws  together the main 
research findings of this paper, and highlights the advantages and disadvantages of GPP in 
comparison to economic policy tools.  
 
6. Summary and discussion 
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Firstly,  GPP is not a cost-efficient environmental policy  tool. All  potential entrepreneurs 
considering a public tender under GPP face the same set of specified environmental criteria, 
although  mos t of them have  different types of production technology. Consequently, the 
outcome of GPP represents an equal reduction in pollution by all firms, which contravenes the 
cost-efficiency  condition. In contrast to this, economic tools are seen to be sharper  and 
automatically lead to  cost-efficient  outcomes. For example, a tax leads to the optimal 
reduction in pollution for each firm given their production technology. In this context, it is the 
mandatory nature of the environmental criteria that limits GPP from being cost-efficient.  
 
Secondly, a major difference between economic tools (e.g. environmental taxes, subsidies, 
fees) and GPP is the decision-making/organizational structure responsible for these policy 
regimes.  The decision-making and implementation of economic tools are generally 
centralized, but this does not apply to GPP. While national and local politicians may express 
an interest in applying GPP, the individuals who organize and implement  it are the civil 
servants working in public authorities. Each procuring entity is represented by an agent who is 
by the political decisions obliged to  implement GPP. Although all types of environmental 
policy tools face information problems, the extent of this problem is arguably greater for GPP 
due to the decentralized nature of its organization and decision-making process, which further 
reduces the probability of GPP operating cost-efficiently.   
 
Another identified problem associated with GPP is its limited ability to create incentives for 
firms to invest in environmentally friendly production technology. If an environmental tax is 
levied, it will be imposed on all firms and as such cannot be avoided. In contrast, potential 
entrepreneurs can always choose not to submit bids to procurement auctions if they find the 
specified environmental criteria too expensive to fulfill. In this context, the scope for GPP to 
create incentives for firms to invest in sustainable production technologies is contingent on 
the producing entity being a sufficiently large and from the perspective of potential bidders 
interesting actor in the relevant market. If the procuring entity chooses to make purchases that 
are of great economic importance for firms,  their incentives  to meet the specified 
envi ronmental criteria are like ly to be stronger. If not, GPP is substantially weakened as an 
environmental policy tool.  
 
There are also characteristics of GPP that, under certain circumstances, could be argued to act 
in its favor. For example, the decentralized decision structure could be adva ntageous in some 18 
 
cases  in comparison to economic tools. An economic tool such as a tax often considers 
environmental problems at an aggregated level, i.e. everybod y in the economy must pay the 
same tax rate. This means, inter alia, that the tax does not take into account the likelihood that 
pollution may have effects that vary in significance from one location to another. In such 
cases, the tax fails to account for the fact that the environment has varying sensitivity to 
pollutants depending on where the pollution occurs. GPP could serve as an instrument to 
consider such spatial variations, adjusting to local conditions, and could also account for 
differences in environm ental preferences between local authorities. However, this approach 
places heavy responsibility on each and every procuring entity to maintain knowledge about 
the environment and how they interact with it locally. Note also that in this case the procuring 
entity  should not pay attention to common (harmonized) criteria to be used when 
implementing GPP, e.g. suggested by the EC and national authorities.  
 
Another possible advantage of GPP is that economic tools are typically limited by national 
boundaries. Taxes, for example, are generally decided at the national level and only target 
firms located within the nation’s geographical boarders. GPP, on the other hand is borderless. 
Within the EU, for example, public contracts are open for firms in any of the Member States 
recognizing the single market. Hence, if a firm located in country A is interested in submitting 
a bid in a procurement auction organized in country B, the procuring entity creates incentives 
for firms located outside the national boundary. Indeed, this option to create incentives for 
firms to invest in sustainable production technology is not limited by the EU boundaries. 
Again, the  power to which this can be realized is  continge nt on the  importance of  the 
procuring entity as a buyer. 
 
Compared to economic environmental policy tools, GPP may in some instances be relatively 
efficient in terms of fulfilling environmental objectives. For instance, as argued earlier, there 
may be political difficulties in levying a tax required to resolve a particular environmental 
objective. In such cases, by specifying that firms must adopt a specific technology, GPP may 
be more efficient in terms of satisfying environmental objectives, delivering large pollution 
reductions relatively quickly. This is especially valid if ‘green’ technologies are  already 
available on the market that has not been widely adopted. 
 
Finally, it is important to note that the effect of GPP on the degree of competition is separate 
from the effect on price. Implementing GPP could deter as well as stimulate entry. However, 19 
 
meeting the environmental criteria can demand investment costs and if so result in higher 
bids. As a consequence the outcome could be that bids are higher although more bids may be 
placed. Another plausible scenario is that bids are higher because fewer bids are placed due to 
GPP being seen as entry deterrence.  The ultimate scenario that is observed in reality is 
entirely market-specific and of an empirical nature. 
 
The main conclusion of this paper is that pursuing environmental policies via the 
implementation of GPP is a complex task. Although GPP is politically appealing as a policy 
measure and has some advantages, it is likely to be more efficient to use economic tools, such 
as taxes, subsidies, fees or emission permits. Finally, decisions about the implementation of 
GPP, as with any other policy tool, should be based on a welfare analysis, in which gains and 
losses are compared and only implemented when the net effect is beneficial.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. The range of GPP outcomes due to different weighting and 
environmental criteria scenarios 
    Environmental criteria 
    Low  High 
Weight attached to 
environmental criteria 
(relative to price) 
Low  (1)  None  (2)  Effect on environment 
High  (3)  Potential effect  (4)  Stronger effect on 
environment than (2) 
 
 
Table 2. GPP – when and to what extent? 
  Degree to which the environmental problem (externality) that GPP 













Yes, as in (1), but 
designed to 
complement 
policy tools in 
force. 
No, given optimal and 
internalized 
environmental quality 
objectives this is not 
justifiable from a 
welfare perspective. 
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Figure 1. Cost-efficient pollution reduction when a tax (t) is imposed, that impacts the 




Figure 2. Cost-efficient pollution reduction when GPP is implemented and firms are 






























Figure 3. Cost-inefficient pollution reduction  when GPP is implemented and firms are 
heterogeneous in terms of production technology (and hence their marginal cost, MC, curves 
differ). 
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